Abstract. We study information flow in a model for data-parallel computing. We show how an extant notion of virtual time can help guarantee information-flow properties. For this purpose, we introduce functions that express dependencies between inputs and outputs at each node in a dataflow graph. Each node may operate over a distinct set of virtual times-so, from a security perspective, it may have its own classification scheme. A coherence criterion ensures that those local dependencies yield global properties.
Introduction
The flow of data generally entails the flow of information, whose understanding is often essential for the performance and correctness of dataflow computations. For example, knowing that two dataflow computations on different input batches do not interfere with one another can open opportunities for asynchronous, overlapped execution. It may perhaps also contribute to ensuring that sensitive inputs do not leak through public outputs, that untrusted data does not taint trusted results, and other security and privacy properties.
Therefore, modern platforms for data-parallel computing sometimes track dependencies, at least coarsely, primarily in order to enable efficient implementations. For instance, Spark maintains dependencies between Resilient Distributed Datasets [17], representing their lineage. Naiad [11] associates messages and other events with virtual times [4] ; the partial order of virtual times, which need not correspond to the order of execution, determines whether one event can potentially result in another event.
Of course, understanding the flow of information does not necessarily mean the same in data-parallel computing and in security and privacy. In particular, covert communication channels are seldom a concern for data-parallel computing. Furthermore, at least at present, systems for data-parallel computing typically leverage strong trust assumptions: most systems code is trusted, and even the environment is often assumed to be somewhat benign.
Nevertheless, we explore the idea that models and systems for data-parallel computing can offer substantial information-flow control. We focus on concepts and facilities for information-flow control, rather than on their applications. Specifically, we consider the computational model that underlies Naiad, called timely dataflow. We find that, after a modest strengthening (and a change of perspective), timely dataflow offers information-flow properties that resemble familiar ones from the security literature.
As indicated above, timely dataflow supports partially ordered virtual times. These virtual times may be viewed as analogous to security levels or classifications. Furthermore, timely dataflow considers the question of whether one event at a given virtual time t and location l in a dataflow graph could result in another event at a virtual time t and location l in the same graph. The expectation that an event at (l, t) cannot result in an event at (l , t ) "in the past" is analogous to conditions on flows across security levels, but weaker. So we identify alternative concepts and properties that, although consistent with timely dataflow, lead to non-interference guarantees.
One somewhat unusual aspect of the resulting framework is that it allows the use of different sets of virtual times (that is, different sets of security levels) in different parts of a system. For example, virtual times inside loops may have coordinates that correspond to loop counters, and can distinguish data from different loop iterations that may be processed simultaneously; those coordinates do not make sense outside loops. From a security viewpoint, virtual times in different parts of a computation may reflect the classification schemes of different organizations, or the classification schemes appropriate to the different kinds of data being processed. While simple levels like "Public" and "Secret" are allowed, there is no built-in assumption or requirement that they mean and are treated the same everywhere. Moreover, each neighborhood of a dataflow graph could have its own custom levels. Finally, a virtual time may be a tuple that includes both structural information (such as loop counters) and other facets, such as secrecy and integrity levels. We define a criterion that ensures the coherence of the use of levels.
Our main results enable us to reason about systems organized as dataflow graphs, and to characterize the information that each node in such a graph may obtain. As a small example (to which we return in Section 5.4), consider a system that receives and processes messages that each pertain to one of two users U 1 and U 2 . Suppose that a particular node p 0 in this system forwards data about each user to a different destination, p 1 or p 2 respectively. We abstract p 0 's behavior by stating that its messages to p 1 do not depend on its inputs about U 2 , and symmetrically its messages to p 2 do not depend on its inputs about U 1 . We make such statements directly, formulating them in terms of virtual times; in other approaches, analogous statements might be encoded in type annotations. From p 0 's properties and the topology of the dataflow graph we may then derive that p 1 learns nothing from the inputs about U 2 , and that p 2 learns nothing from the inputs about U 1 . More generally, our work provides an approach for establishing information-flow properties of a dataflow system from properties of individual nodes and the topology of the system.
The next section is a review of the relevant aspects of the model of computation that we consider. Section 3 introduces auxiliary concepts: frontiers, filtering, and reordering. Section 4 defines and studies the machinery for specifying
